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The seminal work of Nick Bostrom [2014] galvanized thought and discussion about AI safety and the 
Value Alignment Problem, which presupposes that artificial general intelligence (AGI) is desirable and 
perhaps inevitable. It addresses the question of how to align autonomous AI entities with human values, 
goals and purposes. It is motivated by the fear that such entities, if super-humanly intelligent, could evade 
human control and come to threaten, dominate, or even supersede humanity.  
 However feasible or not, the project to imbue AI with human purposes or values is hampered by a) 
the difficulty of formulating them unambiguously; and b) inconsistency within the human community and 
over time. The VAP is a worthwhile exercise if for no other reason than that it holds up a mirror to 
understand the problem of aligning values among and within human beings. 
 AI maps human intelligence onto machine intelligence: if humans have objectives and pursue them, 
then so machines should have objectives and pursue them [Russell, p176]. This conflation follows 
historically from Descartes’ belief that the essence of the human being—as opposed to the animal being—
lies in the capacity for reason. However, the essence of goal-seeking for all agents, as for humans, lies in 
desire and feeling, not reason.   
 The VAP, as usually conceived, is one side of the more general issue of mutual control between 
agonistic agents. The inverse VAP is the problem (for humans) that AI might align human values with 
goals that appear arbitrary or adverse to people. (The mundane power of advertising and propaganda come 
to mind.) More generally, the control problem involved in the VAP is to avoid unintended consequences: to 
get the system to “do what I mean” rather than to literally do what it is told to do. 
 While some transhumanists might consider a superintelligent takeover desirable, 
probably most people would not. The prospect raises many questions, the first being whether 
AGI is inevitable or even desirable. The VAP invites clarification of key concepts such as 
‘agent’, ‘general intelligence’, ‘value’, ‘goal’ (‘final’ and ‘instrumental’), ‘alignment’, etc. One 
aim here will be to explore tacit assumptions and possible inconsistencies lurking behind such 
terms, many of which are somewhat recklessly imported from ordinary language. As is common 
practice in the field, the literature is full of loose usages in the domain of common human 
experience, glibly transferred to AI. Examples of typical “as if” language occur when a machine 
is said to reason or know, to have incentives, desires or motivations, etc. Perhaps these can be 
excused as metaphor or as applications of Dennett’s intentional stance. Yet, they may mask 
genuine confusions and distinctions that are important to clarify.  
 Bostrom [p185] puts his finger on a key question to address: Could one have a general 
intelligence that is not an agent? This points immediately to the need to clarify what general 
intelligence is and what constitutes an agent; and then to questions such as whose values are to 
be aligned and the feasibility and conditions for “friendliness.” Related further questions concern 
Bostrom’s ‘orthogonality thesis’ and the correlated ‘instrumental convergence thesis’. 
 However, a different sort of question concerns various levels of human motivation in relation to the 
promise of AGI. Why bother at all to build a superintelligence that has a will of its own? Likely it is 
assumed that there is some advantage to consolidating diverse functions in a single, autonomous, self-
modifying agent; but this would also increase the challenge of aligning AI behavior with human goals 
[Drexler Sec 13.5]. Especially with the project to create an artificial agent, effort and responsibility are 
transferred from the diverse tasks of individual software development to the mythical catch-all task of 
value alignment. The user-interface is simplified, but the entity created is more complex and along with it 
the programmer’s responsibility. The VAP transfers to AGI the age-old dilemma of aligning values among 
human beings. It proposes to substitute a technical project for a social one. Instead of choosing to develop 
autonomous artificial agents, we could choose instead to more deliberately embrace the social/political 
challenge to coordinate and harmonize people.  
 Instead of consolidating skill in an agent (which acts on its own behalf), it would be safer to create 
ad hoc task-oriented software tools that do what they are programmed to do because their capacity to self-
improve has been deliberately limited. This is the approach advocated by Drexler. An alternative path, 
advocated by Russell, would be to build uncertainty into AI systems, so that they hesitate before acting in 





There have been many definitions of ‘intelligence’, a nebulous term that can refer to a property of an 
organism or system, or an entity that is supposed to be intelligent. The latter is the implicit sense when 
referring to an AI. In the case of GOFAI, clearly the intelligence involved is that of its programmers. The 
issue is less clear when the AI is self-programming or self-modifying. In the case of an agent, its 
intelligence is its own. 
 Intelligence is usually measured through accomplished tasks. It is thus relative to what the testers 
value and propose as tasks. Since we consider ourselves the most intelligent agent on the planet, the 
standard for intelligence is implicitly human. It seems useful to generalize the idea of intelligence in such a 
way as to liberate it from the human standard, which is not only anthropocentric but also represents a 
ceiling. The problem, of course, is that we must approach this generalized notion from the viewpoint of our 
own human intelligence. If superintelligence (SI) can transcend the human ceiling, we nevertheless remain 
limited by it; we may not be able to fathom, let alone measure, superintelligent reasoning.  
 On the other hand, ability to reason may not be the right basis for an intelligent concept of 
intelligence. Moreover, intelligence is not a property residing within an individual so much as a response 
and relationship to the world, which consists in large part of other intelligent beings. The idea of “pure 
intelligence” derives from abstracting certain abilities, through performance tests of various sorts, from 
their social and real-world contexts. Such abilities are then reified as internal powers of the agent 
concerned. Yet, what it means interactively for A to have greater intelligence than B is that the power of A 
over B exceeds the power of B over A.  
 An assumption implicated in the notion of general intelligence is that intelligence is a 
capacity independent of specific goals. This is not true of organisms, even of human beings. 
Such independence (orthogonality) is a human ideal, extrapolating from the relative freedom that 
humans enjoy to set arbitrary goals that have little to do with biological goals or limitations. The 
ideal is to create an entity that has absolute (or at least greater) freedom, beyond the limits 
imposed by human embodiment. However, the intelligence we know through experience with 
people and other creatures is a property of living things. The artifacts we describe as intelligent 
reflect human intelligence. The notion of general or universal intelligence [Legg & Hutter, p4] 
raises the question: To what extent and in what ways is intelligence tied to biology? To what 
degree and under what conditions (if at all) can intelligence be abstracted from its organic 
models and exemplars, to serve as a logically coherent stand-alone concept that can inform the 
notion of artificial general intelligence (AGI)?  
 Certainly, the performance of organisms depends on cognitive abilities, which depend on sensory 
equipment and specific adaptations to environment, in which motor interaction plays a crucial role. 
Moreover, meaning and motivation depend on having a stake in survival and reproduction. (Emotion is not 
irrational, but an alternative, “first-aid,” system of response.) Abstractly, one could say that the natural 
purpose of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty—e.g., by finding an algorithm that does not already exist or 
a routine to replace conscious deliberation. 
 Like an organism, an AI learns through an interactive cycle of perception/action. But the training 
data-set in organisms is not supplied by humans but by the organism itself and its environment. 
“Correctness” of the learning is regulated by natural selection, not through rewards given by an external 
judge or trainer. Without an existential investment in value based on survival, adjusting reality to fit the 
goal would be just as valid as adjusting the goal to fit reality. Bostrom [ibid, p35] recognizes that “there is 
no reason to expect a generic AI to be motivated by love or hate or pride or any other such common human 





In one sense, an agent is anything that does something. Its classical counterpart is a patient, meaning the 
passive recipient of an action, the effect of a cause. Each link of a causal chain plays both roles in the 
transmission of a force. These are arbitrary demarcations within a system, as is the definition or boundary 
of the system itself. Ultimately, there must be a first cause that initiates the causal sequence from outside 
the system. And ultimately the causal system concerned is unbounded: the universe as a whole. While God 
was traditionally needed as first cause—as the only plausible force outside this closed system—
alternatively there is no linear “first” cause in a system of circular causation. 
 In a quite different and more restricted sense, an agent is a first cause. This is the sense of agency 
we normally and personally develop as human beings. It is learned and modelled on our ability to literally 
move our own limbs and thereby move other objects in space. (We do not experience such willing as a 
causal sequence within us, initiated from without, but as a process that originates with us.) In other words, 
we experience ourselves and others (including animals and various spiritual entities) as autonomous free 
agents, independent of any causal chain. At one time in human thinking (and still in some cultures), 
potentially everything could be an agent in that sense. There would have been an adaptive advantage for 
early humans to be alert to potentially dangerous agents, whether animal predators or other humans from 
rival groups [Atran, p77]. 
 The category of patient (that is, inert matter) is a relatively recent development. Perhaps beginning 
with the ancient Greeks, it was inherited by the Semitic religions that served as matrix for the Scientific 
Revolution. The world for us now remains ontologically divided into objects and subjects (agents)—
passive matter and active mind. Like God, the mind of the observer (e.g., scientist) stands outside the 
system observed. This dualism translates into the two extremes of autonomous AGI, on the one hand, and 
hand-written computer code, on the other. It does not accommodate well the nebulous range of possibilities 
between. 
 The only true agents we know are organisms, especially other people. Such an agent is an 
autopoietic system [Maturana & Varela]: a system that is self-producing, self-maintaining, and self-
defining. (In the case of life, it is also necessarily self-reproducing, since life-forms evolved through 
selection over generations.) Agents are also necessarily embodied—meaning not just physically 
instantiated but having a mutual, though dependent, interactive relationship with the environment.1  
 For an agent (i.e., a truly autonomous, autopoietic system), the only “final” or “ultimate” goal is its 
own existence. In that sense, the notion of an alterable or arbitrary final goal seems nonsensical. For an 
agent, self-preservation is not an instrumental goal, at the bottom of a hierarchy of sub-goals. Rather it is 
the unique final goal, at the apex of any hierarchy. An AI that is an autopoietic system will normally 
control its own inputs, gather its own information, define and negotiate its own relationships with the 
world, and may attempt to control the forces or agents attempting to control it. Yet, that is but one extreme 
(represented by AGI) of a range of possibilities. At the other extreme are conventional AI tools that are not 
agents.  
 To follow or obey a command is a different action for an AI agent than it is for an AI tool. An agent 
decides for itself how to interpret the input (in the light of its own needs and goals) and whether and how to 
respond to the command. Just as it is for humans, a goal for an AI should be distinguished from commands 
given to it. A machine “obeys” a command automatically, with no intervening will and no goals of its own. 
An agent may or may not embrace the programmer’s goal as its own, weighed against the backdrop of the 
agent’s own priorities.  
 Can a superintelligent AI that is not an agent pose a serious threat? Under what conditions is an 
agent a mind (and what exactly constitutes mind)? Can a mind be considered a formalizable system 
(software)? If so, what are its limitations in the light of Gödel’s paradoxes? Can the parts of an agent be 
agents in their own right?2 Since embodiment is a necessary aspect of agency, biology may have much to 
teach AI researchers. On the other hand, since biologists have inherited the same mechanistic worldview as 
AI researchers, they might learn from questions that AI brings to the fore.3  
 
Goals, orthogonality, and instrumental convergence 
 
The weak point of defining intelligence as the ability to accomplish goals [Tegmark] is that ‘goal’ is 
undefined and it is unclear whose goals are concerned. Concepts of goals, motivations, mind and agency 
                                               
1 As Maturana & Varela point out, ‘environment’ is a concept in the human cognitive domain; an organism may 
have a different representation of its surroundings or none at all. 
2 Tissues have latent holographic capabilities, which are constrained by their role in the whole organism. 
3 E.g., see [Ebrahimkhani and Levin]: “The existence of designed biobots pushes us to ask what exactly is a 
machine, what features might life have that are permanently… beyond the reach of engineers if they have access to 
the same ingredients and evolutionary methods used by natural life, and what precisely would make something not a 
machine?... As biobots and other forms of artificial life have the benefit of both design and evolutionary dynamics… 
there is no principled reason why future versions could not enjoy the same agency that… evolved lineages do.”  
derive from human experience of dealing with other apparent agents. As self-conscious beings capable of 
reason and abstraction (indeed, having invented them), we conceive and pursue goals that appear to be 
independent of our final goal as organisms—even sometimes contrary to it. This gives the impression that 
we can arbitrarily adopt any goal to be pursued by any means (orthogonality). While true in principle as an 
ideal, it is not so in fact. Like other organisms, humans remain motivated very much by considerations 
grounded in their embodied existence. We might expect the same from AGI. On the other hand, non-
autopoietic systems have no motivation at all, no goals of their own. They could not, as suggested by 
Bostrom, bring to bear self-preservation as an instrumental sub-goal in service of some (arbitrary or 
humanly specified) “final” goal such as winning at chess—unless they were specifically instructed to do so. 
Deep Blue could be given access to unlimited resources and commanded to enhance its ability to play chess 
by taking over the Internet or manufacturing an indefinite number of copies of itself to be hooked up in 
parallel. And that could spell an environmental and existential catastrophe. But it would be an insane 
human decision, not Deep Blue’s. 
 The dilemma of imparting stable goals is that a self-modifying AI may modify what the 
programmer has initially specified as its goal. It might do this because of a meta-goal, deliberately installed 
at the outset by human programmers to optimize some function. But if we suppose that it “naturally” 
modifies its goal through “reasoned understanding,” then we must presume an agent with its own purposes. 
In that case, the human goals concerned must be negotiated with the AI, as they would be with other 
humans or animal agents. Moreover, an AI that is not an agent cannot “care” about anything, including its 
own effectiveness. Stability for an agent is not an instrumental goal to ensure its final goal, but an inherent 
aspect of autopoiesis.4  
 Bostrom offers no absolute distinction between final and instrumental goals (anything can be either, 
in a hierarchical relationship). Instead, he promotes the lack of this distinction as a general principle.5 The 
orthogonality thesis abstracts the human situation of a self (executive function) that happens to be relatively 
detached from the biological goals of the body as an organism. This ideal does not characterize living 
things, however, and would not characterize artificial agents by default. 
 The correlated instrumental convergence thesis tacitly presumes agent status while (by the 
orthogonality thesis) it disclaims any dependence on it. The properties that are framed as “instrumental” 
include self-preservation, goal stability, self-enhancement, expanding real-world resources and power. All 
of these, however, are rather aspects of autopoiesis.  
 Unless an AI happens to be an autopoietic system, its goals could be only those of its programmers, 
its only actions a function of its program. The tricky part is when that program is unknown, for example 
because it is a neural network or some other self-organizing or self-improving system. To presume to 
control the evolution of such a system (a black box) by setting its “initial conditions” is problematic if not 
paradoxical, since what the black box contains cannot be presumed to be a deterministic system. It can be 
known only by its observed outputs. It can be controlled only by containing what we think are its inputs 
and outputs—which is how we generally deal with physical systems, other creatures, and people.  
                                               
4 If “finality” means no more than relative place in a hierarchy, then to what can appeal be made as a basis on which 
to change a final goal? 
5 “Intelligence and final goals are orthogonal: more or less any level of intelligence could in principle be combined 
with more or less any final goal.” [Bostrom ibid p130] (Perhaps the “more or less” is added to accommodate the 
paradoxical situation where the putative final goal is self-destruction.) 
 The presumption may be that a superintelligent AI would inevitably resist being shut down if it is 
given any goal that it must remain operational to accomplish and would be driven to acquire physical and 
computational resources [AAMLA, p.2, quoting Stuart Russell]. This apprehension follows from the 
orthogonality thesis. But there is a missing step in the logic: given a goal, it must also be given the meta-
goal to “optimize”—that is, not to allow obstruction of its goal, whether by being shut down or having 
inadequate resources. However, “resources” are not simply acquired or valued by agents for their 
usefulness toward some arbitrary goal; ultimately, they serve the well-being of the agent trying to acquire 
them. Non-agential AI has no such interest. 
 It is a non-sequitur to jump from the realization that no one can pursue goals when switched off or 
dead to the conclusion that AIs will act preemptively to preserve their existence for the sake of achieving 
some externally specified task. Having no concept of their existence, they will not do so unless told to. To 
be “fully” autonomous, an AI must be an autopoietic system with its own purposiveness. Self-preservation 
will then not be merely an instrumental goal but the final goal, as it is for organisms. In that context, 
“fetching coffee” will be merely a request it honors or not.6 
 In reinforcement learning, rewards are sources of information and direction; but they are not a 
source of values for agents [Drexler, Sec 18.5]. Rewards for agents are instrumental toward the final goal 
of existence. Self-preservation is not at the bottom of a hierarchy of instrumental goals serving an arbitrary 
“ultimate” goal at the apex (as the human ideal of rationality would have it). This inverts the natural order 
for organisms.7  
 More questions arise: At what point in its developing relative autonomy can a program acquire an 
objective other than that of its programmer? How does that come about within the black box of a self-
improving program? Instrumental convergence implies a hierarchy of goals. In humans, there is a distinct 
executive function (a self) with characteristic goals and sub-goals loosely subservient to the final goal. 
How do cells and organs within the body cede autonomy to serve the whole? Under what conditions would 
an AI come to have an executive function, a directing “self”? 




The VAP addresses tension between the ideal of indefinitely extending human capabilities (in service to 
human needs) and the need to retain control over the tools or agents with amplified capabilities. Organisms 
manifest various specialized competences, but these all serve and are related to survival. Universal 
competence is the ideal of unconditional ability to achieve any discretionary goal. It greatly expands the 
more modest goal to match human-level competence. 
 A superintelligence would be faster than humans and smarter in definable ways. Could it also be 
more logical than what humans recognize as logic? Could it have a superior “theory of mind”? Could it 
                                               
6 “Suppose a machine has the objective of fetching the coffee. If it is sufficiently intelligent, it will certainly 
understand that it will fail in its objective if it is switched off before completing its mission. Thus, the objective of 
fetching coffee creates, as a necessary subgoal, the objective of disabling the off switch… There is no need to build 
self-preservation in because it is an instrumental goal—a goal that is a useful subgoal of almost any original 
objective.” [Russell, p141] For autopoietic systems (agents), the sole “original objective” is existence. 
7 Self-preservation could be viewed as a sub-goal of replication, but it is unnecessary to view replication as a goal, 
since it is simply a condition for the continued existence of metabolism. 
foresee eventualities utterly inconceivable to us? How can people evaluate the predictions, or trust the 
actions, of AIs that are so much more intelligent than we are that we cannot understand them? 
 The VAP is sometimes reduced to the challenge to get an AI to “do what I mean, not what I say.” 
This might be realizable through direct brain-world interface with an AI tool, where control could be 
exerted as it is naturally by the will over the limbs. However, the body interprets the brain’s motor signals 
in specific ways. The AI would have to perform some corresponding interpretation. DWIM shifts the 
burden of interpretation to a function outside the nervous system. If that shift is made because one has more 
confidence in the AI than in one’s own mind, DWIM is tantamount to saying “just do what is best for me.” 
The religious version of that faith is “thy will be done.”  
 
 
Friendliness, perverse instantiation, hacking, and wireheading 
 
While the AI should be “corrigible” (with no internal directive to resist its controller’s interference), it 
should also resist attempts by others to hijack control of it. That is, it must be personalized to be loyal to its 
designated controller. This runs counter to the notion of full autonomy. If an agent can question or update 
its instrumental goals, could it not also question its loyalty? The notion of a “highly reliable agent design” 
[AAMLS, p4] may be an oxymoron. There is a tradeoff between performance expectation and reliability. 
Can an AI be expected to learn what “friendliness” is when that is an ideal that humans themselves cannot 
adequately spell out? 
 A tacit agenda is to create a perfect servant whose abilities cannot be defeated by circumstance, by 
other agents, or by its own limitations—which include the possibility to misunderstand its master’s wishes. 
“Perverse instantiation” is the idea that such an AI might go to undesirable extremes to maximize the literal 
achievement of some goal. It might, for example, mobilize disproportionate resources to make money—or 
paper clips—or to serve the coffee. This “sorcerer’s apprentice” possibility is a corollary of the supposed 
orthogonality of intelligence and goals or values. Perverse instantiation in humans is called sociopathy or 
some other pathological condition. That is, people only irrationally engage in it. Why would converting the 
universe to paper clips be more feasible as a goal for AGI than for human beings? And while an AI might 
find some shortcut that produces a counterproductive result, on the other hand that shortcut might be the 
sort of trick that is needed to think outside the (human) box. 
 Any information system can be hacked—either by a third party or by the system itself. An AI may 
be oriented toward goals in the real-world; but, like many organisms, it might use an internal representation 
as a proxy for the external world (its image or model of the world). As is possible with humans and 
animals, the system can mistake the proxy for the reality—and can also prefer it, since it may be easier to 
optimize than the real-world goal. This can happen when the reward in a learning situation is defined in 
terms of the proxy rather than the real benefit—as when people seek a pleasurable experience instead of the 
objective state of well-being the experience is supposed to represent. One aspect of the VAP is to make 
sure the AI pursues the genuine goal rather than the proxy [AAMLS, p12].  
 This sort of concern is heir to Descartes’ skepticism about sensory perception. His solution was that 
God (read: nature) would not permit systematic deception. Through natural selection, the organism itself 
tends normally not to permit such (self)deception. The dilemma of AI wireheading, like perverse 
instantiation, can arise when the system is not an agent following its own path, but is also not a simple tool 
following its user’s path. It is an incidental result of trying to have the cake and eat it—by creating meta-
tools to create other tools. It has roots in the desire to issue a command to create a tool rather than provide a 
method (program) to create the tool.  
 The problem arises when reward signals are confused with actual rewards [Russell p208]. But what 
are “actual” (real-world) rewards for an AI if it is not an (embodied) agent? The programmer’s intention is 
that the reward should lead indirectly to a human benefit, since the AI is supposed to serve human interests. 
The implicit hope may be that the AI would be more objective than many people, who often confuse the 
feeling of well-being with actual well-being. Without an investment in value derived through natural 
selection, however, the relation to reality is arbitrary, so that self-stimulation is as valid as accomplishing 





The essence of the VAP is control. It reflects the general problem of interfering in complex 
systems (i.e., nature), which entrains the possibility of unforeseen consequences. Moreover, any 
system capable of learning is potentially unstable. It may be unreasonable to expect to control an 
agent more intelligent or powerful than oneself. (The only hope for an inferior is that the superior 
is not superior in every way.) While intelligence does not guarantee freedom from error, it can 
magnify the effects of error. After all, AIs face the same problem of short-sightedness that 
beleaguers human decision makers. The VAP for AI mirrors the problem of aligning the values 
of people amongst themselves, within the individual, and with objective reality. The vain hope 
may be to engage AI to articulate human goals and values we do not fully understand and cannot 
articulate ourselves. 
 Superintelligence could make mistakes beyond the ability of humans to detect or correct 
in time. Whether or not it is an agent, reliance on SI as an oracle to consult resembles the 
political problem facing elected officials who must rely on expert advice. Rational trust 
(understanding and agreeing or disagreeing with the advice) depends on a roughly equal 
intelligence, as opposed to blind faith.  
 Humans have evolved a natural way to instill values: socialization. Perhaps an SI might 
be educated and socialized essentially as a child is, acquiring the values of the humans around it 
(and also those of other “children”). If so, the task of learning from humans and of imitating 
them probably requires an AI to develop a “theory of mind.” A pro-active learner will find ways 
to test its theory about what is expected or needed. As in human learning, students ask question 
as well as answer them on tests. Yet, if it is an agent that can think for itself, and especially if it 
can think better than its educators, there is no guarantee that it will continue to embrace the 
values and goals it learns. On the contrary, it likely would form its own values and goals, which 
its educators would be ill-positioned to judge or even to predict. 
                                               
8 On the other hand, there may be situations where achieving the wrong goal is desirable: as in some accidental 
scientific discoveries, this could amount to finding a novel solution outside the box, or realizing that the problem 
was ill-conceived. 
 The obsession with an AI takeover or AI run amok—in literature, film, and now in 
academic study—derives perhaps not only from rational considerations but also from an archaic 
fear of dangerous agents, deeply engrained in the human psyche as an evolutionary adaptation. 
This is one reason why the issue of agency in AI is crucial to understand and resolve. At one 
time in a far more vulnerable position, we’ve boosted ourselves to the top of the food chain and 
want to remain there. Yet, we’re also fascinated by monsters and tempted to create them. 
 
 
Motivations in AI research 
 
Why program a machine against the eventuality that it might be switched off? One answer is that the 
programmer wants to automatically cover all possibilities—e.g., that the program could be hacked, the 
machine accidentally switched off, etc. The underlying presumption behind the search for an infallible 
strategy is that the machine must “fetch the coffee” no matter what.  
 The VAP is a quest for control without being controlled. A key question is whether to consolidate 
all functions within one system that is an agent (tool user), or whether to retain human agency in each case 
by creating separate ad hoc tools. Herein lies a fundamental question of human motivation. Are there 
reasons, apart from apparent convenience and other presumed advantages of consolidation, why we would 
we prefer to deal with an agent rather than ad hoc tools? One such reason might be simply that we are used 
to agents, having been surrounded by other people and creatures for most of human history. Another is that 
we might be driven to create artificial agents by some inner mandate toward divine creativity, to duplicate 
the accomplishments either of God or of nature.     
 Why seek to eliminate human input and participation through automation? An obvious answer is to 
increase efficiency (productivity) and thereby reduce the burdens of human labor. Perhaps modern people 
are never satisfied and simply loathe effort of any kind, even mental. But is the idea just to compulsively 
substitute machine for human labor? Or is it in the faith that superintelligence could accomplish all human 
goals better and more ecologically? One reason for creating agents might be that we are impatient to 
receive the promised benefits of AI systems sooner (such as health benefits). But, if the goal is ultimately 
to automate everything, what would people then do with their time when they are no longer obliged to do 
anything? If the hope behind AI is to free us to “make the best of life’s potential” [Russell p246], what is 
that potential? How does it relate to present work and patterns of activity? What will machines free us for?  
 Aside from real-time use, the quest for AGI serves as a tool to understand human mind and agency. 
For transhumanists, it promises to give birth to post-human forms, even a whole new ecology of artificial 
life forms. For the rest of us, a general lesson is that the consequent changes in human reality should be 
thoroughly considered along with each proposed change in technology. An intention should be followed 
out logically to its foreseeable consequences before it is acted upon. That, of course, requires awareness of 
such intentions, which are usually just taken for granted. What are the deeper and unspoken intentions 
behind the quest for SI? To imitate life, to acquire godlike powers, to transcend nature and embodiment, to 
“optimize” accomplishment of desired goals? Outside the domain of scientific discourse, these becomes 
political, social, and even religious questions.  
 
 
Russell’s strategy to provide uncertainty in machine learning 
 
The threat of an AI takeover seems largely grounded in fears of perverse instantiation—if true agency is 
not involved—or else in fears of losing a contest with superintelligent agents if it is. Both scenarios could 
be avoided if AI was required to consult with humans about their goals. Stuart Russell [2019] proposes to 
achieve value alignment by deliberately keeping AI uncertain about human values. He offers three 
“principles for beneficial machines”: 1) The machine’s only objective is to maximize the realization of 
human preferences. 2) The machine is initially uncertain about what those preferences are. 3) The ultimate 
source of information about human preferences is human behavior [ibid p172-3]. 
 He advocates developing only “provably beneficial AI,” yet (so far) offers no such proof, which on 
one level would be tantamount to proving that a given (humanly specified) goal, and all the conceivable 
ways to achieve it, could lead to no harm. On another level, it would mean proving that all possible 
solutions found by the superintelligent AI, or actions performed by it, could do no harm. While the 
machine might be able to find errors in human proposals, it might not be able to find its own errors. If 
Russell’s approach is ever “proven” beneficial in some formal theorem, there is still the possibility that 
such a proof merely reflects some faulty axiom or assumption we might later identify and regret. 
 The basic problem is that a machine which “assumes it knows the true objective perfectly… will 
never ask whether some course of action is OK, because it already knows it’s an optimal solution for the 
objective.” [ibid p175] (We are all familiar with single-minded people who know they are right and 
governments that prohibit criticism or opposition.) Russell’s solution is that the AI should have no 
“preference” of its own (i.e., it’s not an agent) and that it be uncertain about the human preferences it is 
supposed to serve. 
 The AI is to infer human preferences (motivations, values) by observing human behavior, which is 
inconsistent and differs among individuals. The more random, inconsistent, or seemingly irrational the 
behavior modelled, the more uncertain the modelling AI should be regarding human preferences—and the 
more willing to ask directions in a given situation. But another way to put this (and the VAP) is that the 
usefulness and safety of automating a service in this context depends on the consistency and rationality of 
human behavior. Imperfection is only an issue when perfect rationality is the programmer’s goal, which in 
turn reflects an intention to account for all possible contingencies.  
 The tool is supposed to help us toward some ideal or better state, which it can hardly do if it simply 
mimics human irrationality and inconsistency. An AI can learn to predict the idiosyncratic preferences of 
an individual—on the model of data tracking. But that may be a very shallow interpretation of that person’s 
preferences, even their shopping preferences. A personal AI (e.g., a robot assistant) can train to learn and 
update an individual’s desires, which may not be consistent and may change over time. When it detects an 
inconsistency (over time, with other goals, or with its current model of reality), an AI can ask what to do. 
Training to accommodate multiple users, let alone humanity at large (a generalized median human?), 
would be far more daunting. 
 Since multiple interpretations of human behavior are always possible, the AI’s hypotheses cannot 
rely solely on observation (such as perusing cultural records, the Web, etc). They must be tested through 
some interaction not limited to simply asking questions. As Bostrom [p151] points out, whether an AI has 
achieved a real-world goal is an empirical question it can only verify within some margin of uncertainty. If, 
for example, the existence of a fixed number of paperclips is the goal, the AI must have some way to 
search the real world for paperclips. (This is how an agent would operate, while a program might halt by 
counting its own operations, which it can do with certainty.) But how could an AI verify it has achieved the 
maximal realization of human preferences or done its best toward that end?  
 
 
Drexler’s CAIS: creating AI services rather than AGI 
 
K. Eric Drexler [2019, Sec 1.1] offers another approach to the VAP. As an alternative to trying to create 
artificial agents (AGI), he proposes a model for AI development “that can implement general intelligence 
in the form of comprehensive AI services (CAIS), a model that includes the service of developing new 
services.” Specifically, he distinguishes “recursive technology improvement” from self-improving agents, 
and presents a model of general intelligence centered on services rather than systems. He argues that AGI 
agents offer no compelling advantage over a “pool of functionality” consisting of conventional R&D and 
AI tools. He notes [ibid Sec 5.6] that his proposal is contrary to what is commonly assumed in the AI 
community—namely, that advanced AI systems will: (1) Exist as individuals, rather than as systems of 
coordinated components, (2) Learn from individual experience, rather than from aggregated training data, 
(3) Develop through self-modification, rather than being constructed and updated, (4) Exist continuously, 
rather than being instantiated on demand, and (5) Pursue world-oriented goals, rather than performing 
specific tasks.  
 In contrast, his model “shows how to provide, on demand, systems that can perform any of a fully 
general range of tasks without invoking the services of a fully general agent [ibid Sec 10.6].” Drexler 
doesn’t prove this contention, but argues for it indirectly.9 Some may object that the range of capabilities 
cannot be the same for CAIS as for AGI. (In compensation, the difference in liabilities might be huge.) A 
“fully general agent” must be an autopoietic system; but what would be a partially general agent? The 
difference between “recursive improvement” (on his model) and “self-improvement” (on the AGI model) is 
that there is no “self” involved in CAIS. But what exactly is the difference in terms of programming?  
 Drexler distinguishes crucially between providing a service and developing a system to provide that 
service. According to him, we should not automate the process of automation, despite the seductive 
appearance of convenience involved. If an AI can make excellent decisions for us, then it can just as well 
suggest excellent options for consideration by human decision makers [ibid Sec 27.5]. That is, oracles are 
safer than AGIs and just as effective. 
 The question of how far to pursue automation raises general questions about human aspirations. 
Compare a voice-activated automatic coffee maker and a general-purpose robot that can operate a 
conventional coffee maker along with many other tools or devices. The advantage of the robot is that it 
serves as a personal assistant, a proxy for human agents—an advantage that could be outweighed by the 
risks. For the purpose of making coffee, however, what advantage does the robot offer? Consider now the 
automated coffee maker with more and more integrated functions added (ability to maintain supplies of 
coffee beans, sugar and milk, water and electricity; control over a robot body to serve you coffee in bed, 
etc). At what point should we draw a line in integrating automated services?  
                                               
9 “The classic AGI agent model.… hides what by nature must be functionally equivalent to fully-automated and 
open-ended AI research and development. Hiding the complexity of AI development in a conceptual box provides 





1. The field of AI research would benefit by clarifying terms casually imported from everyday speech, and 
by clarifying unspoken and perhaps unconscious motivations.  
 
2. The “real” value alignment problem is how to align the values of human beings. 
 
3. AI tools must be distinguished from AI agents, which are autopoietic systems. 
 
4. The notion of general intelligence is derived from experience with agents, from which it cannot be 
divorced. The intelligence of an agent is its own; the intelligence of a tool is that of its programmers. 
 
5. The goal to create superintelligence must be distinguished from the goal to create artificial agents. 
Superintelligent tools can exist that are not agents; agents can exist that are not superintelligent. 
 
6. Real-world goals for AI must be distinguished from specified tasks. 
 
7. An agent is necessarily embodied, which means in a relationship with the world that matters to it. 
 
8. Only one “final” goal is possible for agents: their own existence. 
 
9. The orthogonality thesis is an unwarranted assumption. In the case of genuine agents, it is simply untrue. 
In the case of tools, the goals and intentionality involved are not those of the AI but of its programmers. 
 
10. The control problem and the VAP are byproducts of the desire to create meta-tools that are neither 
conventional (“first-order”) tools nor true agents. 
 
11. It is problematic if not impossible to control an agent more intelligent than oneself. The VAP concerns 
a vain challenge to have the cake and eat it. 
 
12. Instead of consolidating skill in an agent (which acts on its own behalf), it would be wiser to create ad 
hoc task-oriented software tools that do what they are programmed to do because their capacity to self-
improve is deliberately limited. 
 
13. It might be advisable to build uncertainty into AI systems, which are then obliged to hesitate before 
acting in ways adverse to human purposes—and to consult with humans for guidance. 
 






1. Can there exist an AGI that is not an agent?  
 
2. What threats can an SI pose that is not an agent? 
 
3. How does developing a task-oriented capability differ from developing a human-style general 
capability? 
 
4. At what point in developing relative autonomy and competence, if at all, can a program acquire an 
objective other than that of its programmers? 
 
5. “Optimization” is a goal of human designers. Can it be proven, one way or the other, that it is not an 
inevitable emergent property of self-programming systems (such that a self-improving AI would 





To be fully autonomous, an AI must be an autopoietic system (an agent), with its own purposiveness. No 
AI should be an agent, which acts by default on its own behalf. Rather, AIs should be limited to oracles to 
consult and task-specific tools that do what they are programmed to do and so remain under human control. 
Whether and under what conditions an AI can be an agent is a separate question, which hinges on 
satisfying the conditions for embodiment. While there might be advantages to the general competence 
sought in AGI, there is little advantage to AI agency, except for irrational psychological reasons—
including laziness—yet many dangers. AI could help people to align their own values and productions to 
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